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Abstract
The UK’s National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) is responsible 
for conducting health technology assessment (HTA) on behalf of the National Health 
Service (NHS). In seeking to justify its recommendations to the NHS about which 
technologies to fund, NICE claims to adopt two complementary ethical frameworks, 
one procedural—accountability for reasonableness (AfR)—and one substantive—
an ‘ethics of opportunity costs’ (EOC) that rests primarily on the notion of alloca-
tive efficiency. This study is the first to empirically examine normative changes to 
NICE’s approach and to analyse whether these enhance or diminish the fairness of 
its decision-making, as judged against these frameworks. It finds that increasing 
formalisation of NICE’s approach and a weakening of the burden of proof laid on 
technologies undergoing HTA have together undermined its commitment to EOC. 
This implies a loss of allocative efficiency and a shift in the balance of how the 
interests of different NHS users are served, in favour of those who benefit directly 
from NICE’s recommendations. These changes also weaken NICE’s commitment 
to AfR by diminishing the publicity of its decision-making and by encouraging the 
adoption of rationales that cannot easily be shown to meet the relevance condition. 
This signals a need for either substantial reform of NICE’s approach, or more accu-
rate communication of the ethical reasoning on which it is based. The study also 
highlights the need for further empirical work to explore the impact of these policy 
changes on NICE’s practice of HTA and to better understand how and why they 
have come about.
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Introduction
In any healthcare system operating with finite resources, decisions must be made 
about how those resources are allocated. This inevitably creates both ‘winners’ and 
‘losers’, as some groups find their needs prioritised while others are prevented from 
accessing potentially beneficial technologies. Healthcare priority-setting is thus an 
essential but often contentious activity, which must be subject to robust justification 
if its outcomes are to be considered ethically, socially and politically acceptable.
The heated debate that often surrounds priority-setting is reflected in the experi-
ences of the UK’s National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE). Tasked 
by the UK government in 1999 with advising the National Health Service (NHS) 
on its adoption of new and existing health technologies, NICE is no stranger to 
controversy and has regularly had to justify both its decisions and its reasoning to 
politicians, patients and the public [23, 31, 73, 74, 76]. In the absence of any soci-
etal consensus on how the needs of NHS users should be prioritised, it has sought 
to demonstrate the fairness of its decision-making through reliance on two ethical 
frameworks, one procedural and one substantive.
The first of these, “accountability for reasonableness” (AfR), seeks to secure 
fairness through the pursuit of a fair process [16]. This is represented by the ful-
filment of four conditions: (1) that both the decisions made and the grounds for 
reaching them are made public (‘publicity’); (2) that these grounds are ones that 
fair-minded people would agree are relevant in the particular context (‘relevance’); 
(3) that there are opportunities for challenging and revising decisions and resolving 
disputes (‘appeal and revision’), and (4) that measures are in place to ensure that 
the first three conditions are met (‘enforcement’) [16, 40]. A complementary sub-
stantive framework, termed an “ethics of opportunity costs” (EOC), further specifies 
AfR’s ‘relevance’ condition by stipulating that resources should be distributed with 
regard to allocative efficiency [67, 68]. Under EOC, technologies are judged primar-
ily on their cost-effectiveness—that is, the amount of health they deliver per unit 
cost—compared with available alternatives, measured by the so-called incremental 
cost-effectiveness ratio1 (ICER). Through the process of health technology assess-
ment (HTA), an individual technology’s ICER is compared against NICE’s overall 
cost-effectiveness threshold to indicate whether it represents an efficient use of NHS 
resources. This threshold theoretically represents the point at which the health bene-
fits displaced to fund a technology (the ‘opportunity cost’) exceed the health benefits 
that it can be expected to deliver. Maximising efficiency would therefore require the 
NHS to only adopt technologies whose ICERs fall below this threshold. However, 
under EOC wider equity concerns are also incorporated through the deliberations 
of an independent appraisal committee, which make allowances for other poten-
tially relevant social and ethical values. Relatively cost-ineffective technologies may 
1 A technology’s ICER is calculated by dividing the incremental change in expected costs by the incre-
mental change in expected health effects. The latter is measured in quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs). 
The QALY provides a quantitative measure of a technology’s effect on both quantity and quality of life, 
measured in life-years and on a 0–1 scale respectively.
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thus be recommended if the committee judges these wider considerations important 
enough to justify the associated loss of allocative efficiency.
Although this approach seems ethically sound [67], the controversial nature of 
its work makes NICE subject to significant social, political and financial pressures 
[74]. These, in turn, make its methods vulnerable to adaptation in ways that might 
curtail or undermine its fundamental commitment to fairness. A review of the lit-
erature (“Appendix 1”) indicates that, to date, there has been no systematic study 
of how NICE’s approach to priority-setting has changed normatively over time and 
therefore no basis from which to consider the wider implications of these changes. 
This paper attempts to address this gap by empirically examining normative devel-
opments to NICE’s approach and analysing whether these enhance or diminish fair-
ness, as defined by NICE’s stated reliance on the AfR and EOC ethical frameworks.
Methods
The study adopted a mixed-methods design, comprising thematic analysis of NICE 
HTA policy documents and semi-structured qualitative interviews.
NICE currently operates several HTA workstreams, including the ‘core’ technol-
ogy appraisal (TA) programme, established in 1999, and a dedicated Highly Spe-
cialised Technologies (HST) programme, established in 2013. This study focused 
on these programmes because: (1) TA is the largest and most long-established of 
NICE’s HTA workstreams, (2) both TA and HST are used primarily to evaluate 
pharmaceuticals rather than other technology types, and (3) they are unique across 
NICE’s workstreams in carrying a funding mandate—that is, NHS England is 
obliged to make funds available for the technologies that they recommend.
Thematic analysis covered 32 documents published between 1999 and 2018, 
including each edition of the core technical manuals relating to TA and HST. (See 
“Appendix 2” for a full list.) The study’s analytical approach broadly followed that 
described by Braun and Clarke [4]. Following familiarisation with each document, 
a single coder deduced an initial set of codes relating to potentially normative con-
tent.2 (“Appendix 3”.) Qualitative data relevant to each code were then systemati-
cally extracted and collated, with documents analysed by chronological age and 
further codes added inductively as required. Once collated and assigned to a code, 
data were analysed and mapped to identify potential themes and patterns. This pro-
cess was iterated and themes refined before being used to develop an interview topic 
guide.
Following thematic mapping, between June and October 2017 eight semi-struc-
tured interviews were conducted with longstanding participants in (or close observ-
ers of) NICE HTA. Their purpose was to contextualise, scrutinise, validate and chal-
lenge empirical findings and their preliminary interpretation by the researcher. Each 
2 Content was classed as normative if it had potential implications for NICE’s treatment of social and 
ethical values, defined as any evaluative consideration that does not solely contribute to the calculation of 
a technology’s ICER.
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interview lasted between one and 2 hours. Interviewees were selected purposively 
and were intended to represent a variety of perspectives. They included an appraisal 
committee Chair, a NICE Board member, two senior members of NICE staff, two 
technical advisors, an industry representative and an academic commentator.3 Inter-
views were based on a detailed topic guide which asked interviewees to indepen-
dently identify key changes to NICE’s approach before commenting on emerging 
findings highlighted by the researcher and possible interpretations. (“Appendix 4”.) 
Interviews were digitally recorded and key data (including direct quotes) extracted 
in note form within 48 h. Recordings were consulted as required during preparation 
of this paper.
Results
Two main themes emerged from the study: (1) the formalisation of NICE’s approach 
to HTA, and (2) increased leniency in its evidential requirements and handling of 
evidence.
Before considering these themes, it should be acknowledged that the analysis also 
revealed a high degree of continuity in NICE’s approach and a long-standing com-
mitment to the AfR and EOC frameworks. NICE’s use of ICERs, quality-adjusted 
life-years (QALYs) and the cost-effectiveness threshold as its preferred tools for 
decision-making, with some allowance for relevant social and ethical values, has 
been consistent since the institute’s inception. Linked to this, the distinction between 
assessment, in which evidence relating to a technology is collated and evaluated in 
order to establish an estimated ICER, and appraisal, in which an independent com-
mittee balances this information against other potentially relevant considerations 
before making a recommendation, has consistently formed the backbone of NICE 
HTA. Nevertheless, aspects of NICE’s approach have undergone significant change 
over time, with important normative implications.
Formalisation of NICE’s Approach to HTA
Since the TA programme was established in 1999, NICE’s documented approach 
has become increasingly standardised, specified and detailed: that is, it has become 
more formalised [78].
This trend can be crudely illustrated by comparing the length of each edition 
of the TA technical manuals (Fig.  1). Unsurprisingly given that NICE was in the 
global vanguard of nationalised healthcare priority-setting, early editions of these 
process and methods manuals had little precedent to draw on and were thus high-
level and brief. The first (combined) edition contained only eight pages of sub-
stantive content4 and was limited to general advice, for example, on the topics that 
4 Excludes title pages, contents, forewords and appendices.
3 Some of these individuals were no longer in these roles at the time of interview.
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manufacturers should “give consideration to” when submitting evidence to NICE, 
leaving the “format”, “length” and detailed content of such submissions unspecified 
[33]. As both NICE and the HTA field have matured, the level of detail that these 
manuals contain has increased substantially, as has their length. The current process 
and methods manuals contain 79- and 60-pages of substantive content respectively 
and are supported by a 36-page evidence submission template and a 54-page user 
guide, demonstrating the more demanding formal requirements that participants in 
NICE TA are now expected to comply with [46, 48, 49].
This increase in the volume of guidance relates to both the methods used to con-
duct HTA and the processes followed in applying those methods. It also spans two 
distinct phases of activity: assessment and appraisal.
Formalisation of Assessment
NICE defines assessment as the systematic evaluation of evidence relating to a tech-
nology’s clinical- and cost-effectiveness [46]. It is carried out by an independent 
academic group, drawing heavily on a detailed submission prepared by the technol-
ogy’s manufacturer, and typically results in the calculation of a technology’s esti-
mated ICER. This precedes and provides the starting point for appraisal, during 
which other sources of evidence, such as expert testimony and public consultation 
responses, are considered alongside the wider social and ethical implications of a 
technology’s potential adoption. Compared with appraisal, assessment is thus a rela-
tively technical process, in which normative considerations play a less central role. 
Nevertheless, its conduct has important implications for fairness.
The trend towards formalisation of assessment has been underway since 1999 but 
is punctuated by the introduction of the so-called ‘reference case’ in 2004: a ‘blue-
print’ standardising the calculation of a technology’s ICER by limiting variation 
Fig. 1  Substantive length of NICE TA technical manuals, editions 1–5 [33, 34, 36, 37, 41, 42, 46, 48]
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across several technical domains.5 Although earlier manuals had indicated a pref-
erence across several of these domains, NICE at the time stated that the manu-
als should be treated as “an aid to thought […] rather than as a substitute for it”, 
acknowledging that its preferred methods “would require interpretation in the con-
text of each specific technology” [34]. In contrast, the norm established by the refer-
ence case can only be deviated from by exception, with ICERs derived from non-
reference case analyses having to be “justified and clearly distinguished” from this 
norm [36]. Within the reference case, certain elements have also become more spec-
ified over time. The EuroQol-5-dimension (EQ-5D) instrument, for example, one 
of several tools available to measure health gain, has gradually evolved from being 
something that should be “ideally” used [36], to being the “preferred measure” [41], 
to being an instrument that would require “empirical evidence” to support its non-
use [46]. Normative judgements implicit in these choices—for example, the lack of 
parity between physical and mental health that some argue is inherent to the EQ-5D 
[71]—have thus become embedded.
Another normative judgement that has become increasingly formalised is the 
scope of effects that can be included in the calculation of a technology’s ICER. The 
1999 edition of the manual was both non-specific and inclusive: calculations could 
take account of a technology’s “direct and indirect costs” to the NHS, as well as 
unspecified “wider costs […] and benefits”, which could be presented to, and con-
sidered by, an appraisal committee [33]. Over time, more precise advice has led to 
the exclusion of many of these wider effects. For instance, consideration of a tech-
nology’s impact on economic productivity, expressly permitted in 1999 [33], was 
restricted to cases in which this was “thought to be an important element of the 
benefits” in 2001 [34], was “not normally” permitted by 2004 and is now explic-
itly “excluded” [41, 46]. Similarly, while consideration of “significant resource costs 
imposed outside the NHS” was permitted until 2004 [36], this is now allowed only 
in “exceptional circumstances” and with the prior agreement of the government [41, 
46]. Thus, over time several value judgements that were previously open to delibera-
tion have become embedded through the formalisation of assessment and closed off 
to committee consideration.
Formalisation of Appraisal
Formalisation has also occurred across appraisal: the process through which an 
independent committee balances the information contained within the assessment 
report against a range of other considerations in judging whether a particular tech-
nology should be adopted by the NHS [46]. This evolution in policy has occurred in 
two main stages.
5 These include but are not limited to: the type of economic evaluation used; the unit of measurement 
of health gain; the method by which such gains are measured and valued, and the discount rate applied.
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2002–2008: Guidance Based on General Principles Developed Through Public 
Participation
In the early years of NICE’s existence, appraisal committees were guided in their 
decision-making by a set of high-level ethical principles formulated with the aid of 
public participation. In 2002, recognising the importance of normative judgements 
and acknowledging that NICE and its committees “have no particular legitimacy to 
determine the social values of those served by the NHS”, NICE established its Citi-
zens Council (CC) [1, 65]. Selected as a representative sample of the UK public, the 
CC was periodically consulted on specific normative questions and helped NICE to 
develop a set of general ethical principles to guide its conduct of HTA. These were 
compiled in 2005 as Social value judgements: principles for the development of 
NICE guidance (SVJ), a formal policy document issued by NICE’s Board of Direc-
tors and intended for use by both internal and external stakeholders.
The first edition of SVJ contained 13 principles that endorsed or discouraged 
various value judgements, while acknowledging that “there will be circumstances 
when—for valid reasons—departures from these general principles are appropriate” 
[38]. The second edition, published in 2008, took a less permissive tone; it advised 
committees that “all NICE guidance […] should be in line with […] the social value 
principles set out in this document”, discouraging departure from the principles, 
even in exceptional circumstances [40]. However, while compliance was made more 
stringent, the principles themselves remained (and in some cases became more) 
accommodating, allowing significant room for interpretation.6 Thus, while SVJ was 
taken seriously as a source of ethical guidance, committees retained considerable 
freedom to exercise judgement on a case-by-case basis.
2009 Onwards: Guidance Based on Decision‑Rules of Unclear Provenance
Until the late 2000s, SVJ—informed by the deliberations of the CC—provided the 
basis for NICE’s normative approach. However, in recent years the importance of 
both SVJ and the CC has waned. Unlike the regularly reviewed technical manu-
als, SVJ has not been updated since 2008 and several interviewees suggested that 
it is no longer regularly consulted by appraisal committees.7 The CC, which used to 
meet once or twice a year, has not met since 2015. In place of the principle-based 
approach facilitated by these tools, a more rigid one based on formalised ‘decision-
rules’ appears to have emerged. Much clearer expectations have therefore been set 
6 For example, in 2005 principle 6 advised that access to technologies should only be limited to par-
ticular age groups when “there is clear evidence of differences in the clinical effectiveness” across these 
groups. In 2008, this principle was broadened to include “other reasons relating to fairness for society as 
a whole”, alongside differential clinical-effectiveness.
7 Since this work was carried out in 2017, NICE has issued a consultation on “the principles that guide 
the development of NICE guidance and standards”. This appears intended to supercede SVJ and states 
that “although much of what it [SVJ] contains is still relevant to our work, we consider that it is no 
longer the best way to communicate the principles”.
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about the value judgements that committees should make and the circumstances in 
which they should make them.
Decision‑Rule 1: The Cost‑Effectiveness Threshold The first decision-rule to emerge 
was the use of an explicit cost-effectiveness threshold, together with the specification 
of several value-based factors for justifying committees’ violation of this basic rule.
Under EOC, NICE’s foremost distributive concern is to support “an NHS objec-
tive of maximising health gain from limited resources” by basing its recommenda-
tions primarily on allocative efficiency: that is, cost-effectiveness [46]. Prior to 2004, 
this rested on appraisal committees’ “judgement” in deciding whether “on balance, 
the technology can be recommended as a cost-effective use of NHS resources”, 
with committees themselves left to identify and weigh any “significant matters of 
equity which might compensate” for poor cost-effectiveness [35]. In 2004, this flex-
ible approach was replaced with more restrictive advice that a technology can nor-
mally only be deemed cost-effective if its ICER falls below or within a range of 
£20,000–£30,000/QALY [36]. NICE has always maintained that this ‘threshold’ 
is for guidance purposes only and that appraisal committees do not use “a precise 
maximum acceptable ICER above which a technology would automatically be 
defined as not cost-effective, or below which it would” [46]. However, alongside this 
figure the 2004 manual goes on to specify four “factors” that a committee should 
“make explicit reference to” if it is to recommend a technology whose ICER exceeds 
£20,000/QALY (Table 1) [36]. Above £30,000/QALY, “the case for supporting the 
technology on these factors has to be increasingly strong”, suggesting that commit-
tees should not recommend such technologies on other value-based grounds [36].
Since 2004, the £20,000–£30,000/QALY threshold range has remained 
unchanged. However, the factors used to justify breaching it have undergone sub-
stantial revision, with a trend towards greater specification (Table  1). In particu-
lar, one initially ambiguous factor—the “particular features of the condition and 
population receiving the technology”—has been replaced by a highly specified 
decision-rule.
Decision‑Rule 2: The ‘End of  Life Rules’ Following NICE’s high-profile rejection 
of several late-stage cancer drugs in 2008—and the public and political protest 
that ensued [9, 76]—NICE’s methods were amended to give special priority to 
life-extending treatments for terminally ill patients. The so-called ‘end-of-life’ 
(EOL) rules, introduced in 2009 and updated in 2016, replace the general advice 
that committees consider “the particular features” of the population being treated, 
with a specific instruction to consider “giving greater weight to QALYs achieved 
in the later stages of terminal diseases” [43]. This has had the effect of increasing 
the cost-effectiveness threshold for these technologies (exclusively, to date, cancer 
drugs) to £50,000/QALY.8 To be evaluated under this more favourable threshold a 
8 Although the original articulation of the EOL rules did not specify the magnitude of the additional 
weight to be applied to QALYs gained at the end-of-life, a maximum multiplier of 1.7—implying an 
adjusted upper limit to the threshold range of £50,000/QALY—was quickly established in practice and 
has since been formalised in the current methods guide.
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technology is required to meet two substantive criteria: it should (1) be indicated 
“for patients with a short life-expectancy, normally less than 24 months”, and (2) 
offer “an extension to life, normally of at least an additional 3 months compared 
to current NHS treatment” [50]. A third criterion, that a technology be “licenced 
or otherwise indicated for small patient populations” was rescinded in 2016 [43]. 
NICE has never offered any empirical or theoretical basis for these three criteria.
Decision‑Rule 3: QALY Weighting for  Highly Specialised Technologies A further 
example of formal prioritisation of a particular patient group relates to the HST 
programme, dedicated to drugs for very rare, usually serious conditions.
Given the small commercial market and high price often demanded for highly 
specialised technologies [20], the likelihood of their being recommended based 
on cost-effectiveness alone is very low. As such, when the HST programme was 
introduced in 2013 its methodology eschewed use of an explicit cost-effective-
ness threshold, leaving the appraisal committee to reach a deliberative judgement 
that balanced “value for money” against other value-based considerations [47]. 
However, in 2017 this approach was replaced by a more formulaic one which 
stipulates both a precise cost-effectiveness threshold (£100,000/QALY) and a sin-
gle value-based justification for exceeding it. According to this approach, above 
£100,000/QALY a committee’s “judgements” about a drug’s “acceptability” as an 
effective use of NHS resources “must take account of the magnitude of the incre-
mental therapeutic improvement, as revealed through the number of additional 
QALY’s gained” over a patient’s lifetime [47]. More specifically, the weight 
assigned to each additional QALY is defined by a numerical scale, ranging from 
one (for technologies delivering up to ten additional QALYs) to three (for tech-
nologies delivering 30 or more additional QALYs). The HST manual does not 
provide any basis for this decision-rule and its use appears to conflict with SVJ’s 
advice that committees should “evaluate drugs to treat rare conditions […] in the 
same way as any other treatment” [40].
Decision‑Rule 4: Differential Discounting of  Costs and  Benefits One effect of 
weighting QALYs based on lifetime therapeutic improvement is to favour young 
patients suffering from severe or life-shortening diseases, who can potentially 
accrue large benefits over a long time-period. This group has also been formally 
prioritised through a change to NICE’s policy on discounting; the custom of valu-
ing effects that are experienced today more highly than those that are experienced 
in the future [5, 12, 26].
Prior to 2011, NICE’s policy was to discount both the costs and benefits asso-
ciated with a technology’s adoption at a rate of 3.5%, as recommended by the 
UK Treasury [41]. The normative implications of this seemingly technical judge-
ment became apparent following the appraisal of a potentially life-saving drug 
for osteosarcoma—a rare childhood cancer—in which significant discounting 
of the long-term benefits to the children that it saved was partly responsible for 
the drug exceeding the usual cost-effectiveness threshold [44]. Following public 
criticism of the appraisal committee’s provisional decision not to recommend the 
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drug [28, 32, 60], NICE amended its discounting policy to allow health benefits 
to be discounted at a lower rate of 1.5% in “special circumstances”, namely when 
“treatment effects are both substantial in restoring health and sustained over a 
very long period (normally at least 30 years)” [45]. The CC was consulted on this 
matter several months later and gave qualified support to NICE’s use of differen-
tial discount rates. However, it stated that it was “reluctant to compile a defini-
tive list” of those factors that might be “relevant” in deciding when to apply this 
policy [55].
Increased Leniency in Evidential Requirements and the Handling 
of Evidence
The second major theme emerging from this study relates to NICE’s approach to the 
use and handling of evidence.
Evidential Requirements
The study identified three key examples of policy developments that have led to a 
weakening of the evidential requirements for recommending individual technologies.
Increased Willingness to Rely on Non‑randomised and Indirect Study Designs
When assessing a technology’s impact, NICE has historically advocated the ‘hier-
archy of evidence’ first promulgated by the evidence-based medicine movement in 
the early 1990s [27, 69]. This claims that “different types of study design can […] 
be ranked according to a hierarchy that describes their relative validity” for estimat-
ing clinical effectiveness, with randomised controlled trials (RCTs) “ranked first” 
compared with other study designs [36]. Thus, NICE’s manuals have historically 
expressed “a strong preference for evidence from ‘head-to-head’ RCTs”, with evi-
dence derived from other study types ideally acting only to supplement this pre-
ferred source [36]. This preference is retained today, but both documentary and 
interview evidence suggest that NICE has become more willing to base decisions 
on less preferred sources of evidence. For example, recent editions of the methods 
manual contain substantial new material on the use of both “non-randomised and 
non-controlled evidence”, such as observational studies, and “indirect comparisons 
and network meta-analyses”—advanced statistical techniques for comparing tech-
nologies that have not been subject to a direct head-to-head trial [46]. The manual 
acknowledges that these methods carry “additional uncertainty”, but implies that 
they nevertheless provide an acceptable basis for decision-making; committees are 
simply advised to take this uncertainty “into account” when estimates of clinical 
effectiveness are “derived from indirect sources only” [46]. Interview evidence sup-
ported this interpretation, with one interviewee stating that committees today were 
expected to make decisions on the basis of “much much worse evidence” than in the 
past.
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Health Care Analysis 
Subgroup Analysis
An increased tolerance of uncertainty is also apparent in NICE’s changing approach 
to the use of subgroups.
The consideration of how ICERs might vary across different groups of patients—
for example, based on disease stage, or risk factors—has always featured in NICE’s 
approach. However, early editions of the manual stipulated stringent criteria for the 
use of subgroup analysis because of the loss of statistical power that comes from 
dividing a trial population into smaller subsets, and the potential for bias to be intro-
duced through ‘data dredging’ (i.e. searching for patterns in data that have arisen 
from chance) [29, 70, 79]. Over time, NICE has become more permissive about the 
use of such analyses, in relation to both the rationales that underlie subgroup iden-
tification and the point at which this identification is made. According to NICE’s 
early advice, the decision to conduct subgroup analysis should be actively “justified” 
through “a sound biological a priori rationale” for the existence of subgroups and 
“evidence that clinical-effectiveness or cost-effectiveness may vary between such 
groups” [34]. The “credibility” of subgroup analysis would be “improved” if “con-
fined to the primary outcome and to a few predefined subgroups”, minimising the 
opportunity for “ad hoc data dredging”, which was explicitly prohibited [34, 36]. 
Today, this requirement for “clear clinical justification” [36] has been rescinded and 
replaced with a far more wide-ranging basis for subgroup identification: namely 
“known, biologically plausible mechanisms, social characteristics or other clearly 
justified factors” [46]. Similarly, while “post hoc data ‘dredging’ in search of sub-
group effects” is “to be avoided” and will be “viewed sceptically”, the requirement 
for subgroups to be identified prior to appraisal on the basis of an a priori expecta-
tion of difference has been significantly weakened; the identification of subgroups 
post hoc, “during the deliberations of the Appraisal Committee”, is now expressly 
permitted [46]. Subgroup analysis is also now performed as standard—“as part of 
the reference-case analysis” [46]—rather than by exception, despite the inherent 
uncertainty underlying such analyses.
Special Evidential Standards for Cancer Drugs
The most explicit change to NICE’s evidential requirements concerns technologies 
eligible for consideration under NICE’s EOL rules; that is, cancer drugs.
Since 2004, the methods manual has advised committees to take uncertainty into 
account when evaluating technologies with high ICERs, with committees discour-
aged from recommending adoption of technologies that appear to be both poorly 
cost-effective and subject to considerable uncertainty. Specifically, above ICERs of 
£20,000/QALY “the committee will be more cautious about recommending a tech-
nology when they are less certain about the ICERs presented” [41, 46]. This policy 
is in tension with the EOL rules because the drugs typically evaluated under these 
rules almost always have ICERs exceeding £20,000/QALY—otherwise reference to 
the rules would be unnecessary. They are often also subject to what one interviewee 
described as “huge uncertainty”, stemming from limitations in the clinical trials sup-
porting the use of many cancer drugs, which are often of limited duration, reliant on 
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surrogate end-points and lacking a comparator arm, as well as being industry-funded 
[2, 14, 17, 62]. Thus, rather than supporting the exercise of increased caution, the 
EOL rules provide a means for appraisal committees to recommend high-ICER 
technologies about whose clinical- and cost-effectiveness there remains substantial 
uncertainty.
Following review and revision of the EOL rules in 2016, the level of uncertainty 
deemed acceptable was further increased through a caveat stating that technologies 
assessed under the rules must merely have “the prospect of” offering a 3-month 
extension to life [43, 50].9 For technologies failing to meet this requirement, the 
appraisal committee has the further option of recommending their use through the 
Cancer Drugs Fund (CDF)—a source of ring-fenced funding in England—as long 
as they “display plausible potential for satisfying criteria for routine use” [emphasis 
added] (i.e. an ICER not exceeding £50,000/QALY). Thus, over time NICE’s formal 
policy concerning high-ICER drugs has shifted from one that suggests increased 
exercise of caution in cases of uncertainty, to one that actively encourages their rec-
ommendation despite such uncertainty, as long as they are indicated for cancer.
Collation, Review and Evaluation of Evidence
Alongside changes to evidentiary requirements have been changes to the ways in 
which evidence is amassed and handled prior to use by an appraisal committee. This 
has occurred primarily through the introduction of new process variations which 
seek to increase the speed and efficiency of NICE HTA and reduce costs by making 
assessment ‘lighter touch’ and transferring workload from independent academic 
groups, commissioned by NICE, to industry. (Table 2).
Prior to 2006, all technologies assessed within NICE’s TA programme underwent 
multiple technology appraisal (MTA). Under MTA, responsibility for assessment 
rests with an independent academic group known as the “assessment group” (AG), 
which is responsible for preparing a comprehensive report on the clinical- and cost-
effectiveness of one or more technologies (or indications) for use by the appraisal 
committee. Although drawing on evidence submitted directly by the manufacturer, 
the assessment report “provides a systematic review of the literature” and is there-
fore “an independent synthesis” of all of the available evidence [37]. Notably, the 
AG does not have any vested interest in the result of the assessment.
In 2006 a new process of single technology appraisal (STA) was introduced. 
Under STA, responsibility for assessment continues to rest with an independent 
academic group, but the remit of the renamed “evidence review group” (ERG) is 
limited to performing “a technical review of the manufacturer/sponsor’s evidence 
submission” [39]. Although the ERG may “identify gaps in the evidence base”, no 
independent systematic review is performed, meaning that primary responsibility for 
evidence collation rests with the manufacturer [39]. This trend towards increased 
9 The original articulation of the rules required that there be “sufficient evidence to indicate that the 
treatment offers an extension to life, normally of at least an additional 3 months, compared to current 
NHS treatment”.
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reliance on evidence and analysis sourced from industry has continued with the 
introduction of fast-track appraisal (FTA) in 2017. Designed to “make available, 
more quickly, those technologies that NICE can be confident would fall below 
£10,000 per QALY”, FTA limits the role of the ERG to one of providing a “com-
mentary” and “technical judgements” on evidence received from the manufacturer 
[51, 57]. It is also the only process to directly involve NICE staff in assessment, with 
members of the NICE secretariat working alongside the ERG to prepare a “joint 
technical briefing” for the appraisal committee’s use. As well as “summarising” the 
available evidence, this briefing sets out “the scope of potential recommendations” 
based on an “application of NICE’s structured decision making framework” [51]. 
This implies that provisional recommendations may be made within the joint brief-
ing and in advance of committee deliberations, potentially reducing the role of the 
committee to one of approving decisions that have been presumed since the apprais-
al’s initiation (i.e. that the technology will be found to be cost-effective and recom-
mended) and ratified by NICE staff and the ERG during assessment.
Interviewees suggested that the introduction of STA—and now FTA—reflects 
a shift in NICE’s onus on conducting “the most detailed, independent academic 
assessment that could be done” to completing appraisals quickly and efficiently, in 
part by relying more heavily on industry involvement. In the words of one inter-
viewee, the introduction of STA “was the start of a slippery slope and we’ve just 
gone further and further down that route”.
Discussion
This study, the first systematic examination of how NICE HTA has developed nor-
matively over time, has identified two key themes: (1) formalisation of NICE’s 
approach across both assessment and appraisal, and (2) increased leniency in its evi-
dential requirements and handling of evidence. Overall, the effect of these trends has 
been to undermine NICE’s commitment to both the AfR and EOC frameworks and 
thus the fairness of its decision-making as defined by these frameworks. The wider 
political, social, organisational and economic implications of these developments 
are beyond the scope of this paper.
Ethical Implications of the Formalisation of HTA
A key principle of justice—implicit in both the AfR and EOC frameworks—is 
that of formal equality: the notion that cases that are alike in normatively rel-
evant respects should be treated as like [11, 24]. AfR requires that decisions be 
made on grounds that fair-minded people would agree are relevant to the par-
ticular context. Decisions that violate formal equality by treating like groups dif-
ferently therefore violate this condition, as no fair-minded person would support 
such grounds [66]. EOC similarly rests on formal equality in requiring that, all 
else being equal, technologies that are similarly cost-effective be treated similarly 
[67]. Given this implied need for formal equality under NICE’s stated ethical 
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approach, formalisation has the potential to enhance fairness if it acts to increase 
the consistency of decision-making across similar cases. However, formal equal-
ity also requires sensitivity to context; that is, it requires that cases that are unlike 
in normatively relevant respects be treated as unlike. This sensitivity is secured 
under EOC by requiring that potentially relevant differences between cases be 
given due consideration by an appraisal committee before a decision is reached. 
Formalisation makes this less likely if it restricts committees in their ability to 
take context into account and exercise judgement on a case-by-case basis. Thus, 
in seeking to secure fairness through formalisation, the benefits of consistency 
must be balanced against the harms of insensitivity.
These benefits and harms differ across the assessment and appraisal processes. 
While appraisal is clearly heavily value-laden, assessment can be viewed as a more 
technical activity in which sensitivity to normative concerns is comparatively less 
important. Increased consistency through formalisation therefore may have greater 
potential to enhance fairness when applied to assessment than to appraisal. As one 
interviewee explained, NICE’s “more prescriptive” approach to assessment has led 
to manufacturers preparing “more standardised, better quality submissions”, mak-
ing it easier for committees to compare technologies consistently, and reducing the 
likelihood of them misunderstanding key findings or being deliberately misled by 
complex technical strategies intended to flatter the technology being appraised. Of 
course, this is not to claim that assessment is value-free or that the formalisation of 
value judgements within it is unproblematic; increased consistency still comes at a 
price. One might argue, for example, that individual economic productivity is a rel-
evant consideration in some contexts but not in others and that consistently ignoring 
it allows unlike cases to be treated as like. However, NICE could reasonably argue 
that this is a point on which fair-minded people disagree, meaning that the grounds 
for this decision remain relevant, and that any loss of sensitivity is justified by the 
benefits of increased consistency.
Formalising some relatively uncontentious value judgements through assessment, 
then, may be a sensible strategy for providing appraisal committees with a consistent 
starting point from which to weigh a technology’s ICER against other value-based 
considerations. However, formalisation of appraisal raises more significant con-
cerns, particularly when this takes the form of highly specified decision-rules which 
limit committees’ potential to exercise judgement.
The oldest and most fundamental of these rules is the £20,000–£30,000/QALY 
threshold, which provides the touchstone for defining cost-effectiveness under EOC. 
If applied strictly, the existence of an explicit threshold reduces sensitivity to norma-
tive concerns substantially. However, as NICE makes clear, the threshold is deliber-
ately stated as a range so as to provide committees with space to exercise judgement, 
and it is also formally defeasible: that is, it can be revised or overridden in appropri-
ate circumstances [6]. Thus, while a technology’s ICER forms the starting point for 
discussion, the appraisal committee exists to ensure that other relevant factors are 
also considered and, if they are of sufficient weight, used to justify exceeding the 
threshold. Thus, the rule’s relative indeterminacy and defeasibility ensure a degree 
of consistency in decision-making while allowing committees freedom to exercise 
judgement and remain sensitive to relevant differences.
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Over time, however, NICE’s policy concerning the threshold has become 
more  restrictive. The manuals’ increasing specification of those circumstances in 
which exceptions can be made, together with the introduction of the three decision-
rules highlighted above, significantly restricts committees’ freedom to exercise 
judgement by defining and limiting both the relevant ways in which cases can dif-
fer and the appropriate response to these differences. The EOL rules, for example, 
reduce a complex normative judgement concerning prioritisation of the terminally 
ill to positive questions about whether or not particular substantive criteria have 
been satisfied and a precise maximum threshold of £50,000/QALY. They are insen-
sitive to potentially relevant differences within these criteria—for instance, a tech-
nology that offers a 3-month extension to life is treated the same as one that extends 
life by 5 years—and they limit committees’ freedom to consider other potentially 
relevant factors, such as the age of those concerned. The relevance of some of these 
formal criteria can also be questioned, with population studies and deliberations of 
NICE’s CC suggesting that fair-minded people might not support some of the values 
on which these rules are based [10, 30, 53, 54, 56, 72].
While committees are not explicitly prevented from exercising judgement in 
interpreting and applying these more specified rules, it is arguably naïve to consider 
them defeasible in any meaningful sense. In the politically charged, high-profile 
environment in which committees operate, the establishment of formal norms cre-
ates strong expectations that are difficult to disappoint, particularly when this would 
mean saying ‘no’ to a technology that might otherwise be recommended. Indeed, 
doing so might leave committees’ decisions open to appeal or even judicial review.10 
As one interviewee put it, the existence of these rules means that “there is less scope 
for committee members to use their judgement” during appraisal, with the result that 
appraisal becomes a “rubber stamping exercise” to ratify judgements embedded in 
the rules, rather than an exercise in deliberative decision-making. It thereby under-
mines NICE’s commitment to a distributive framework that relies on deliberation to 
identify and respond to relevant normative considerations.
These rules also redefine what can be considered cost-effective by increasing the 
threshold against which technologies are judged. Assuming that the ‘true’ oppor-
tunity cost to the NHS does lie somewhere between £20,000/QALY and £30,000/
QALY, such ‘threshold creep’ implies a significant loss of efficiency, reducing the 
total amount of health the NHS can deliver. This could be justified under both AfR 
and EOC if the value judgements precipitating it could be shown to be relevant and 
arrived at through case-by-case deliberation. However, as described above, this can-
not be demonstrated. As such, the formalisation of appraisal through the introduction 
10 It is feasible that a committee’s decision not to recommend a technology could be subject to judicial 
review on the grounds that substantive reasonable expectations established by the existence and previ-
ous operation of formal norms had not been met. The manufacturer of a technology that demonstrably 
met NICE’s end-of-life criteria, for example, might claim that a committee’s decision to reject it at an 
ICER < £50,000/QALY was unlawful on these grounds. Even if such a claim were likely to be unsuc-
cessful, as experience seems to suggest [75], fear of judicial review might nevertheless make committees 
reluctant to make such a recommendation.
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of decision-rules that seek to define normatively relevant considerations and guide 
committees’ response to them can be shown to undermine both AfR and EOC.
Formalisation also poses a challenge to AfR’s publicity condition. This requires 
that the rationales on which decisions are based are publicly available, but value 
judgements that are embedded in the assessment process cannot be considered truly 
‘public’. The policy to consistently exclude economic productivity from the calcula-
tion of a technology’s ICER, for example, is currently made 45-pages into a 95-page 
technical manual and is characterised as a technical requirement rather than a value 
judgement [46]. It also goes unmentioned in SVJ, which stakeholders might reason-
ably expect to provide an overview of the rationales adopted as standard in NICE’s 
approach, and is unlikely to form a subject of deliberation during public appraisal 
committee meetings because the decision to exclude it as a consideration has already 
been made [40]. Value judgements based on complex quantitative criteria (e.g. the 
EOL rules) similarly suffer from a potential loss of publicity because their applica-
tion centres on whether or not a given technology satisfies the necessary substantive 
criteria; largely a matter for technical discussion during the relatively closed process 
of assessment, rather than deliberation during the more open process of appraisal. A 
counter argument, of course, is that less formal, more discretionary modes of deci-
sion-making pose even greater challenges to publicity because the complex ration-
ales used may be difficult to fully convey and record on paper; further research is 
needed to establish whether this is the case for the relatively detailed documentation 
surrounding each NICE technology appraisal. Nevertheless, the lack of transparency 
of value judgements embedded within processes that appear exclusively technical 
remains, and is arguably made more insidious by the expectation—not present under 
a purely discretionary approach—that formal norms will be clearly stated and fully 
adhered to.
A further challenge to both the relevance and publicity conditions stems from the 
arbitrariness of the criteria on which these decision-rules are based, none of which 
have been publicly justified on either empirical or theoretical grounds. While rigor-
ous academic arguments would not necessarily be expected from a policy body such 
as NICE, failure to provide any justification for such criteria makes NICE vulnerable 
to accusations that they are based on political expediency rather than morally rel-
evant considerations. For example, several interviewees suggested that the £50,000/
QALY threshold implied by the EOL rules was initially based on the political need 
to approve a particular cancer drug whose ICER was close to this figure, and that the 
change in discounting policy was similarly precipitated by the desire to recommend 
a particular drug [9, 59, 61, 63]. As well as undermining the relevance condition, 
failure to publicly justify these changes—or to acknowledge the political motiva-
tions underlying them—weakens or even contravenes AfR’s requirement that the 
grounds for reaching priority-setting decisions are made public.
Ethical Implications of NICE’s Changing Approach to Evidence
This study also demonstrates several ways in which NICE’s changing approach to 
the use and handling of evidence has led to a weakening of the burden of proof 
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for recommending a technology’s adoption. This has important implications for 
NICE’s commitment to AfR and, in particular, the allocative efficiency so highy 
valued through EOC.
The study has highlighted three ways in which NICE’s use of evidence has 
changed over time: through (1) an increased willingness to rely on non-ran-
domised and indirect study designs; (2) more frequent and generalised use of sub-
group analysis, and (3) the lowering of evidential requirements in relation to can-
cer drugs. In the case of both (1) and (2), the implications for NICE’s tolerance of 
uncertainty is, in principle, mixed. The traditional hierarchy of evidence of which 
RCTs are the pinnacle has been subject to much criticism [3, 7, 64, 80, 81] and 
NICE’s formal move away from the hierarchy does not require that committees 
base their decisions on poor evidence. However, as several interviewees pointed 
out, political and organisational pressures, as well as pragmatic considerations, 
make it difficult for committees to ‘shirk’ decision-making on the basis of insuf-
ficient evidence, particularly when NICE’s formal policy signals a willingness to 
rely on study types that are inherently subject to high levels of uncertainty and 
when there is little prospect of more, or ‘better’, evidence becoming available in 
the future. The implications of changes to NICE’s policy on subgroup analysis is 
similarly ambivalent in principle, but likely not in practice. In theory, subgroups 
can be used either ‘positively’, to identify a cost-effective group for which a tech-
nology that is cost-ineffective overall can be recommended, or ‘negatively’, to 
exclude a specific cost-ineffective group from a population that is cost-effective 
overall. In practice, interviewees made clear that the former is much easier to 
employ than the latter. In the words of one, if committees “think that something 
is going to be cost-effective on average, then they’re not looking for subgroups 
to say ‘no’ to”, whereas “the other way around, in my experience, they would 
be looking for subgroups” to say ‘yes’ to”. Thus, as another interviewee put it, 
subgroup analysis is primarily “a way of making things available” to patients who 
would otherwise not have access, despite the greater relative uncertainty associ-
ated with this type of analysis. The observed changes to policy on both study 
types and subgroup analysis are therefore likely to increase committees’ tolerance 
of uncertainty and weaken the burden of proof to which technologies undergoing 
HTA are subject.
In the case of cancer drugs, recent changes weaken this burden of proof to the 
point that it is arguably reversed. Under the revised EOL rules, cancer drugs need 
only demonstrate “the prospect of” offering a 3-month extension to life to warrant 
recommendation up to the £50,000/QALY limit, or the “plausible potential” for 
achieving cost-effectiveness (according to this limit) for inclusion in England’s Can-
cer Drugs Fund [50]. This implies that such a drug should only be rejected outright 
if it can be shown to have no prospect of offering the required extension to life, and 
no plausible potential for achieving the required ICER. This shifts the burden of 
proof from the manufacturer, who was previously responsible for demonstrating that 
their drug likely met the criteria for cost-effectiveness, towards the appraisal com-
mittee, which in order to reject such a drug now needs to demonstrate that it likely 
does not. Thus, the likelihood that technologies will be recommended on the basis 
of over-optimistic estimates of cost-effectiveness is increased.
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Changes to the way in which evidence is collated, reviewed and evaluated further 
enhance this risk by increasing NICE’s vulnerability to bias. Following its introduc-
tion in 2006, STA quickly replaced MTA as the most utilised process and the major-
ity of appraisals are now conducted via STA [8, 52]. However, both STA and FTA 
involve significantly less independent oversight than MTA and transfer responsibility 
for collating, presenting and analysing the evidence on which assessment is based to 
the party with the most to gain from a recommendation: the manufacturer. If this could 
be shown to lead to clearly cost-effective technologies being adopted by the NHS 
more quickly and at less administrative cost, then this ‘lighter touch’ approach could 
be justified as both good for the patient and as fair to the manufacturer. However, given 
the strong financial incentive that manufacturers operate under and the many sources 
of uncertainty inherent to HTA, transfer of responsibility for assessment to the man-
ufacturer raises the potential for bias to permeate the many assumptions and judge-
ments that contribute to calculation of a technology’s ICER. Of course, these judge-
ments remain subject to independent oversight by the evidence review group (ERG). 
But given that the manufacturer’s ‘base case’ ICER will almost inevitably support the 
technology’s recommendation, under STA and FTA the ERG is tasked with effectively 
having to disprove this base case if it is to demonstrate that a technology is not cost-
effective. Once more, the burden of proof has shifted away from the manufacturer. 
Finally, in the case of FTA there is the further risk that ERGs and appraisal commit-
tees themselves will be subject to confirmation bias—the tendency to seek evidence 
that might confirm or verify existing beliefs or conjectures (e.g. that a technology is 
cost-effective) and to ignore evidence that might disconfirm or refute them [15].
In theory, the weakening of the burden of proof that these changes together make 
likely could either enhance or undermine NICE’s commitment to the EOC frame-
work. EOC requires that, equity considerations aside, technologies that are demon-
strably cost-effective are adopted while those that are not are rejected. Given that 
HTA is invariably subject to uncertainty, there is always a risk that ‘errors’ will 
occur: that is, a cost-effective technology will be inaccurately classed as not cost-
effective, or vice versa. To prevent such errors from occurring, it is essential, first, 
that the threshold against which cost-effectiveness is judged is appropriate. However, 
burden of proof also plays an important role. The likelihood of cost-effective technol-
ogies being incorrectly classed as not cost-effective is increased if the burden of proof 
is high and if it rests on the technology being appraised (i.e. if there is a presumption 
of cost-ineffectiveness). Conversely, if the burden of proof is reduced or reversed (i.e. 
if there is a presumption of cost-effectiveness), there is an increase in the likelihood 
of cost-ineffective technologies being wrongly classified as cost-effective. Both errors 
reduce allocative efficiency and—in the absence of other equity-based considera-
tions—are therefore incompatible with fairness as defined by EOC.
The question of whether the observed reduction in NICE’s burden of proof has, in 
practice, led to an overall loss of efficiency is a matter for empirical research and can-
not be proven here. However, there are strong reasons to suggest that it has. Empirical 
evidence indicates that NICE’s basic £20,000–£30,000/QALY threshold significantly 
 Health Care Analysis
1 3
overestimates the opportunity cost to the NHS, implying that many technologies 
are being wrongly classed as cost-effective [13]. If these findings are accurate, then 
the de facto increase in the threshold brought about by the formalisation of NICE’s 
appraisal process has likely led to further loss of NHS efficiency. Against this back-
drop, additional policy developments that allow for greater tolerance of uncertainty 
and increased risk of bias in favour of the technology being appraised inevitably 
increase the likelihood that cost-ineffective technologies are being recommended, 
further reducing efficiency. That is, these trends are likely additive.
As a result of these changes, interviewees consistently believed that technologies 
that NICE would have rejected 15 years ago were regularly being recommended today, 
leading to a fundamental shift in how the interests of different NHS users are balanced 
in favour of those who stand to benefit directly from access to such technologies. Thus, 
the needs of the ‘average’ NHS user are deprioritised, as existing interventions and 
NHS services are displaced to fund the new, branded technologies that NICE typically 
appraises. In the words of one interviewee, “the benefit of the doubt” under current 
policy is “always in one direction: the patient in front of you, the recipient in front of 
you, the manufacturer in front of you”, with committees “almost ignoring the fact that 
[recommending a technology] would impose costs on others”. This shift has occurred 
gradually, without any public disclosure of the underlying rationale for this pattern of 
change, undermining NICE’s commitment to AfR’s publicity condition, and is based 
on formalised value judgements that are themselves open to question. If the tangible 
result of these changes is to reduce the efficiency of the NHS—as seems likely—then 
they considerably weaken the EOC framework, further undermining NICE’s commit-
ment to publicity by contributing to an inaccurate representation of NICE’s substan-
tive approach. As such, while certain elements of NICE’s evolving approach to HTA 
have the potential to enhance fairness, the overall effect of these changes has been to 
undermine it through a weakening of NICE’s commitment to both AfR and EOC.
Conclusion
This empirical exploration of normative changes to NICE’s HTA approach has high-
lighted two concerning trends, which together appear to increase the likelihood that 
poorly cost-effective technologies will be recommended for adoption by the NHS. 
Further research is needed to understand why these changes have come about, but 
we might reasonably speculate that political pressures have played a part. Although 
legally a non-departmental (or “arms’ length”) public body and operationally inde-
pendent of the Department of Health, NICE remains financially reliant on the gov-
ernment and has therefore had to robustly justify its continued existence during a 
period of significant change for the health service and the adoption of numerous 
austerity measures [58]. Given the government’s repeated reference to the life sci-
ences industry as a key driver of economic growth [18, 25], and the importance of 
accelerating access to innovative new therapies—for the benefit of both patients and 
the national economy [19]—it is perhaps unsurprising that NICE’s own policies 
have evolved in line with these wider political aims. Global efforts to speed up the 
adoption of effective new treatments [21, 22, 77] may likewise have exerted pressure 
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on NICE to recommend adoption of ‘innovative’ health technologies, as well as 
influencing the quantity and quality of evidence available to committees attempting 
to establish the cost-effectiveness of such products [17]. Finally, changes to key per-
sonnel within NICE and other stakeholders, public and patient pressure facilitated 
through both traditional and social media, and shifts in the wider social and political 
environment in which NICE operates may have each played a role in its apparent 
drift towards more permissive treatment of the technologies that it appraises.
Speculative as these hypotheses may be, this paper has demonstrated a policy 
trend that appears to undermine NICE’s proclaimed commitment to procedural and 
distributive justice as conceptualised through AfR and EOC. Further empirical work 
is required to explore the impact of these changes to policy on practice. However, 
it seems likely that the overall effect has been to undermine the fairness of NICE’s 
decision-making and reduce NHS efficiency in a manner that cannot easily be jus-
tified. A substantial volte-face—either to NICE’s methods or to the ethical frame-
works on which it claims these are based—may be required if coherence is to be 
restored to its approach. Such widescale change may prove unfeasible in the short-
term. But if NICE is to remain credible in the eyes of the public in whose interests 
it claims to act, there is a need for it to more accurately communicate the normative 
judgements on which its decisions are based, either through an update to SVJ or 
through an entirely new attempt to explicate its ethical approach.
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Appendix 1: Literature Review
A semi-systematic literature review was conducted between April and July 2017. 
The review focused on literature addressing the following question: ‘How has the 
process, methods and ethical framework used by NICE in its technology appraisal 
programme changed over time and what are the implications for NICE’s treatment 
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of social and ethical values?’. Four databases—PubMed, Scopus, ProQuest and Web 
of Science—were systematically searched using search terms developed for a prior 
systematic literature review and a review of the terms used in pre-identified relevant 
papers. In addition, the Health Management Information Consortium (HMIC) and 
Social Policy and Practice Research (SPPR) databases were searched to identify rel-
evant grey literature.
The search terms used across the review were as follows:
Title/abstract/key (NICE OR “National Institute for Clinical Excellence” OR 
National Institute of Clinical Excellence” OR “National Institute for Health 
and Clinical Excellence” or “National Institute of Health and Clinical Excel-
lence” OR “National Institute for Health and Care Excellence” OR “National 
Institute of Health and Care Excellence”)
AND
Title/abstract/key (“technology assessment” OR “technology appraisal” OR 
HTA OR “cost benefit analysis” OR “cost effectiveness” OR “comparative 
effectiveness research” OR “economic evaluation” OR “healthcare rationing” 
OR “health care rationing” OR “resource allocation” OR “health priorities” 
OR “healthcare priorities” OR “health care priorities” OR “priority setting” 
OR “health technology prioritisation” OR “health technology prioritization” 
OR “reimbursement decision” OR QALY OR “quality adjusted life year” OR 
ICER)
The review identified several papers evaluating individual changes to NICE’s 
methods and trends in NICE decision-making over time. However, it did not identify 
any empirical study of developments to NICE’s approach as a whole or of the poten-
tial ethical implications of these changes.
Appendix 2: Documents Included in Systematic Review of NICE Policy
Year Key policy documents* Supporting documents
1999 Appraisal of new and existing technologies: 
interim guidance for manufacturers and 
sponsors
2001 Guide to the technology appraisal process (1st 
ed.)
Guidance for manufacturers and sponsors/
Guide to the methods of technology appraisal 
(1st ed.)#
Guidance for appellants
Guidance for healthcare professional groups
Guidance for patient/carer groups
2004 Guide to the methods of technology appraisal 
(2nd ed.)
Guide to the technology appraisal process (2nd 
ed.)
Technology appraisal process: guidance for 
appellants
A guide for manufacturers and sponsors
A guide for healthcare professional groups
A guide for NHS organisations
A guide for patient/carer groups
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Year Key policy documents* Supporting documents
2005 Social value judgements: principles for the 
development of NICE guidance (1st ed.)
2006 Guide to the single technology appraisal 
process (1st ed.)
2007 Single technology appraisal process: update
2008 Guide to the methods of technology appraisal 
(3rd ed.)
Social value judgements: principles for the 
development of NICE guidance (2nd ed.)
2009 Guide to the single technology appraisal 
process (2nd ed.)
Guide to the multiple technology appraisal 
process (3rd ed.)
Supplementary advice: appraising life-extend-
ing, end-of-life treatments
2010 Appeals process guide
2011 Clarification on discounting
2013 Guide to the methods of technology appraisal 
(4th ed.)
2014 Guide to the processes of technology appraisal 
(4th ed.)
Guide to the technology appraisal and highly 
specialised technologies appeal process
2016 Addendum A—final amendments to the NICE 
technology appraisal processes and methods 
guides to support the proposed new cancer 
drugs fund arrangements
Rapid re-consideration of drugs currently funded 
through the cancer drugs fund
2017 Fast track appraisal: addendum to the Guide to 
the processes of technology appraisal
Cost comparison: addendum to the Guide to the 
processes of technology appraisal
Procedure for varying the funding requirement 
to take account of net budget impact
2018 Guide to the processes of technology appraisal 
(4th ed.)—2018 update
*Key policy documents include the methods guides, process guides and social value judgements docu-
ments. Versions of these guides that tailor the same information for a more specialised audience (e.g. 
patient/carer groups, NHS organisations), plus any amendment or addendums to these key documents, 
have been classed as supporting documents
#The 2001 guidance for manufacturers and sponsors document contained detailed information on the 
methods of technology appraisal, much of which went on to inform the development of the first formal 
methods guide in 2004. As such, it has been classed here as the first edition of the methods guide
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Appendix 3: Initial Codes Generated Deductively During 
Familiarisation Stage of Thematic Analysis
# Code Description
1 Fundamental principle Any general principles identified by the document
2 Topic selection process Process through which topics/technologies for appraisal are selected
3 Topic selection criteria Criteria according to which topics/technologies for appraisal are selected
4 Outcomes Health and non-health outcomes accounted for directly in the technology 
evaluation
5 Costs Costs to the health service and elsewhere accounted for directly in the 
technology evaluation
6 Economic evaluation Type of economic evaluation and methodology used to measure and 
value health effects. E.g. cost-utility analysis using QALYs based on 
EQ-5D
7 Acceptable evidence The types of evidence considered acceptable in making an evaluation
8 Clinical effectiveness Judgemental factors that can be taken into account in evaluating clinical 
effectiveness e.g. nature and quality of evidence, uncertainty, existing 
alternatives, patients views on outcomes
9 Cost effectiveness Judgemental factors that can be considered in evaluating cost effective-
ness e.g. patient perspectives on quality of life, wider societal benefit
10 Participants Groups and individuals formally invited to participate in the appraisal 
process
11 Discounting policy Discount rate(s) applied and the policy surrounding their application
12 Time horizon Policy regarding the period of time over which costs/benefits can be 
calculated
13 Innovation Any policy regarding how innovation should be treated and valued during 
appraisal
14 Social value judgements Any social or ethical values explicitly regarded as relevant to appraisal 
and decision-making
15 Equalities considerations Any specific considerations to be made regarding the potential for 
inequalities
16 Excluded considerations Any considerations explicitly excluded from consideration during 
appraisal and decision-making
17 Threshold Any explicitly stated cost-effectiveness threshold(s) or threshold range(s)
18 Resource impact Any policy regarding the consideration of resource impact, budget impact 
or affordability during appraisal
19 Appeal criteria Criteria according to which appellants may be heard
Appendix 4: Interview Guide
Note: This basic topic guide was adjusted as appropriate between interviews.
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Topic Questions
Relationship with NICE I’ll begin by trying to understand a bit more about your relation-
ship with NICE and the role that you played in the development 
of some of its key guidance documents
1. As [role], what were your key responsibilities?
   What role did you play in the development of NICE’s approach 
to technology appraisal? For example, how involved were you in 
the various updates to the Process and Methods guides?
   How would you describe your current relationship with NICE?
   Are you involved in any ongoing work to update NICE’s Process 
guide, Methods guide or Social Value Judgements document?
View on key changes to approach This project is focusing on how the process guide, methods guide 
and SVJ document have changed over time and the implications 
of these changes for NICE’s treatment of social and ethical 
values. As such, I’m now going to ask you some quite explora-
tive questions about how you perceive NICE’s approach to have 
evolved over time. Please don’t worry if you’re not able to pro-
vide detailed answers—a general perspective is absolutely fine
2. Over the period of your involvement with NICE, what do 
you consider to have been the most important changes in its 
approach to technology appraisal? By approach, I mean its pro-
cess, methods or guidance on social or ethical values.
   Can you identify any overarching patterns or trends in these 
changes?
   What do you think are the ethical implications of these changes?
Social value judgements document I’m now going to ask some questions focused on the social value 
judgements (or ‘SVJ’) document and its relationship with other 
key pieces of NICE guidance. I’ll then go on to briefly consider 
SVJ’s role in the practice of NICE’s technology appraisal com-
mittees
3. In your experience, what role has the SVJ document played in 
the development of NICE’s process and methods guides?
   What role (if any) has the SVJ document played in the develop-
ment of ad hoc amendments to these guides? For example, the 
2009 ‘End-of-life’ addendum to the Methods guide and the 2011 
‘Clarification on discounting’
   Can you think of any ways in which NICE’s process and meth-
ods guides deviate from the principles set out in the correspond-
ing versions SVJ? I have a copy here of the eight principles set 
out in the most recent 2008 SVJ document if you would like to 
refer to them
Moving on to consider the role of the SVJ document in the prac-
tice of technology appraisal:
   Do you think the SVJ document has become more or less rel-
evant to the practice of NICE’s technology appraisal committees 
since the first edition was issued in 2005?
Citizens Council I’d now like to briefly explore the changing status of NICE’s 
Citizens Council
4. What role has the Citizens Council played in the development 
of NICE’s Process and Methods guides?
   How have you observed this role to have changed over time?
   In your view, are there any aspects of NICE’s process or meth-
odology that conflict with advice given by the Citizens Council?
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Perspective taken during assessment I’m now going to explore NICE’s approach to several specific 
social or ethical values—this is so that you can help me to either 
validate or challenge some of the hypotheses that have emerged 
from this project so far. As a reminder, I am defining a social or 
ethical value to be any factor besides clinical- or cost-effective-
ness that is taken into consideration, either directly or indirectly, 
during technology appraisal
NICE has changed its stance several times on whether non-health 
impacts should be taken into consideration when assessing the 
cost-effectiveness new health technologies. For example, until 
2004 both productivity gains and other non-NHS impacts—such 
as gains experienced by other government departments—could 
be included in the calculation of cost-effectiveness. By contrast, 
under current guidance productivity is explicitly rejected as 
a relevant consideration and non-NHS impacts can only be 
included in exceptional circumstances, with prior agreement 
from the Department of Health, and cannot be included in the 
main ICER calculation
5. Do you agree that NICE’s official guidance has increasingly 
delimited the types of costs and benefits that can be ‘counted’ 
during health technology assessment?
   [If yes]: What do you think are the reasons for this change?
   [If yes]: In your view, has this change in perspective also been 
reflected in the practice of appraisal committees? In other 
words, are committees happy to take into consideration benefits 
presented alongside the reference case, or is the reference case 
analysis the main driver for decision-making?
   Why do you think NICE has now singled out productivity as an 
inappropriate factor for consideration during health technology 
assessment?
1 3
Health Care Analysis 
Topic Questions
Evidence and uncertainty I’d like now to briefly discuss how NICE’s approach to evidence 
and uncertainty has evolved.
Historically, the Methods guide has indicated a strong preference 
for data derived from RCTs. However, over time this preference 
has been less strongly expressed and the guide has provided 
more detailed advice on how alternative sources of evidence 
might be handled; for example, data derived from indirect com-
parisons and modelling
6. Does this increased focus on non-RCT data indicate a greater 
willingness by NICE to make decisions based on less robust 
evidence?
Historically, committees were advised to take the degree of 
certainty into account when recommending technologies at high 
ICERs and to exercise more caution when there is significant 
uncertainty about clinical or cost effectiveness. This princi-
ple still exists, but appears to be in tension with amendments 
brought about by the end-of-life rules and the new cancer drugs 
fund, the wording of which seem to allow for a relatively high 
level of uncertainty at ICERs significantly above the usual 
threshold
Another way of looking at this is that the ‘benefit of the doubt’ 
has shifted, for cancer drugs at least, from the unidentified NHS 
patient whose interests are protected by ensuring that technolo-
gies representing poor value for money are not recommended, 
to the particular group of patients whose interests are served by 
recommending a particular technology, even if this carries an 
opportunity cost for the NHS
   Do you agree with this hypothesis?
   [If yes]: What has been the main driver of this shift?
   [If yes}: Do you think that this shift in the benefit of the doubt 
applies only to cancer drugs, or has it also been adopted for 
other technology types? If so, which?
   [If no]: What alternative hypothesis would you put forward for 
the wording changes referred to above?
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Innovation I’m now going to move on to the topic of innovation
Ever since its creation in 1999, NICE has had a statutory 
responsibility to support innovation. However, the tone of the 
statements describing this responsibility has arguably become 
stronger over time. (I’ve pulled together a few examples, here, 
for you to glance at, if you’d like to see some of the supporting 
evidence for this hypothesis.)
Several recent changes to NICE’s process have also been justified 
on the grounds that they accelerate access to innovation; for 
example, the introduction of the single technology appraisal 
process in 2009, which was intended to accelerate the appraisal 
process and enable it to be initiated closer to product launch
7. Do you think it is fair to say that NICE has become more 
actively ‘pro-innovation’ in recent years?
   [If yes]: What do you think has been the main driver of this 
change?
   [If yes]: How do you think this change in attitude has been 
reflected in changes to NICE’s process and methodology? For 
example, in its appraisal timelines, topic selection criteria, 
evidence requirements, types of recommendation?
   The current version of SVJ states that “NICE should not 
recommend a technology if there is no evidence, or not enough 
evidence, on which to make a clear decision”. Do you think 
that the desire to promote innovation has sometimes led to this 
principle being overridden?
   [If yes]: Do you have any concrete examples for this?
The current Methods guide suggests that the innovative nature of a 
new health technology should only be considered at high ICERs, 
and only when the innovation adds “demonstrable and distinc-
tive benefits of a substantial nature” that have not been captured 
in the reference case calculation
   Does this accord with your experience or perception of how 
appraisal committees respond to innovative products in practice?
Discounting I’m now going to move on to the subject of discounting and how 
changes to NICE’s discounting policy may relate to its social or 
ethical value judgements
8. What do you think were the factors driving the Supplementary 
guidance on discounting issued in 2011 and the subsequent 
change in recommended discount rates?
   Do you think that the reasons for these changes were purely 
technical or did social or ethical values also play a role? For 
example, the desire to prioritise treatments targeting children 
and young people?
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Topic Questions
Formalisation (appraisal) The case of discounting appears to be one of several instances in 
which social or ethical value judgements previously addressed 
through deliberation and the discretionary decision-making of 
appraisal committees are becoming more prescriptive and ‘rule-
based’. Moreover, the rules often tend to introduce quantitative 
criteria rather than providing guidance for deliberation. Other 
examples include the ‘End-of-Life’ rules (which introduced 
several quantitative ‘cut-offs’), the increasingly stringent 
criteria concerning consideration of non-health benefits, and 
the proposed use of QALY weighting in the highly specialised 
technology appraisal process. [Expand on EoL example and/or 
mention BI test if necessary]
9. Bearing our conversation so far in mind, do you think it is accu-
rate to say that NICE has sought to make its social and ethical 
value judgements more ‘rule-based’ in recent years?
   Several of the recently introduced rules employ numerical 
ranges and cut-offs. Do you think that this reflects an emerging 
preference in NICE’s approach for quantitative decision-making 
over deliberative approaches?
Technology assessment is described by NICE as a three-stage 
process, consisting of scoping, assessment and appraisal. This 
sheet summarises what each stage involves, in case a refresher 
would be useful
   Do you agree that social and ethical value judgements are 
increasingly being made in the scoping and assessment phases, 
rather than the appraisal stage?
   [If yes]: Why do you think this trend has emerged?
Formalisation (assessment) A review of the five editions of the Methods guide indicates that 
aspects of NICE’s methodology other than its social and ethical 
value judgments have also become more prescriptive, or ‘rule-
based’, over time, particularly since the introduction of the refer-
ence case in 2004. A general indicator of this is the increasing 
length of these documents: from 12 pages in 1999, to 54 pages 
in 2004, to 94 pages in 2013
10. The 2001 Guidance for Manufacturers and Sponsors states 
that it “should be seen as an aid to thought during the process 
of submission rather than as a substitute for it”. Do you think 
that this advice still applies to the current Methods guide, or has 
NICE’s methodology become less flexible over time?
The number of NICE appraisal programmes has increased over 
time, from two core programmes in the early 2000s [technology 
appraisal and clinical guidelines] to six today, several of which 
also have multiple process variations (e.g. MTA, STA, FTA)
   Is it accurate to say that this expansion in the number of NICE 
programmes and processes has been necessitated in part by the 
reduced flexibility of the core technology appraisal programme?
   In your experience, how does NICE address technologies that 
cannot easily be appraised through its standard methodology?
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Topic Questions
Political landscape (relationship 
with government)
I’m going to finish by asking two sets of questions concerning 
NICE’s role in the political landscape. These are much more 
explorative than the last few questions, so they could be a little 
challenging to answer on the spot. My first question concerns 
NICE’s changing relationship with government and the extent to 
which it is able to act independently in developing its approach 
to technology appraisal
11. How would you characterise NICE’s relationship with the 
most recent government and how do you think this compares 
with its relationship with previous governments?
   How do you think that government priorities are reflected in the 
way that NICE conducts technology appraisal? For example, in 
the process of topic selection? In NICE’s approach to innova-
tion? In its consideration of wider societal impacts?
Several of the more controversial recent changes to NICE’s 
approach have been issued by NICE’s Board, rather than 
through a full methodology review. [For example, the End-of-life 
rules, supplementary advice on discounting, budget impact test.]
   Do you think that this reflects an increase in the political pres-
sure NICE is now exposed to?
Political landscape (NHS) My last question focuses on the relationship between NICE’s 
methodology and the financial pressures faced by the NHS
12. NICE’s cost-effectiveness threshold hasn’t formally changed 
since 1999, but financial pressure on the NHS has increased 
significantly during this period. What techniques, if any, do you 
think NICE has employed over the years to maintain the overall 
affordability of its advice for the NHS?
   Would you say that the budget impact of individual technologies 
has become more or less relevant to decision-making as NICE’s 
methodology has evolved over time?
In a public health system funded by finite resources, tension inevi-
tably arises between the needs of the individual and the needs 
of the population. This tension arguably becomes more acute as 
the system experiences greater financial stress. Principle 5 of the 
current SVJ document states that “although NICE accepts that 
individual NHS users will expect to receive treatments to which 
their condition will respond, this should not impose a require-
ment on NICE’s advisory bodies to recommend technologies that 
are not effective, or are not cost effective enough to provide the 
best value to users of the NHS as a whole”
   Do you think that NICE’s methodology, overall, remains com-
pliant with this principle?
AOB 13. Is there anything else you’d like to add or discuss that we 
haven’t covered?
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